

our sentences are rectilinear. We don't expect paintings or arguments to be circular and we don't expect our rooms to be so; often people express discomfort with their non-rectangular forms (like many American folklorists at the circular Renaissance Center in Detroit when they had their annual meeting there) without realizing why, unless they recognize that many traditional patterns in western culture are founded on the aesthetic satisfactions of the rectilinear form. Recall, for example, that the host of *non-traditional* modern commercial buildings shaped like a product such as hot dogs, donuts, and so on (sometimes called dingbat architecture or vernacular roadside architecture) screamed novelty because their cylindrical forms stood in sharp contrast to the rectangular buildings around them (and the round barn never did catch on!)². The justified margins on these very pages testify to an implicit cultural insistence on the ordered, balanced rectangular form, even if it means added cost and strain.

By "consciously invoked codes" I mean that such patterns and customs are often learned by socially accepted rules that may be overtly stated. The builder's plans although formally followed still reflect traditional aesthetics, attitudes, and beliefs (Bronner 1983). The dates for our holidays are officially known; the rules for appropriate behavior at sporting events may be understood; and certainly prescribed etiquette and dress codes generate customary models that affect our repeated behavior. People's participation in the activities of living mean that they are exposed to patterns and codes that they interpret customarily. In a similar vein, Herskovits (1949) called such information folklore acquired by virtue of the circumstances to which the person is born. Then, if word-of-mouth and imitation are forms of informal learning through transmission and use, customary example is informal learning through "absorption."

Lore consequently represents expressive knowledge gained from informal learning processes. Knowledge becomes converted into action and perhaps into custom; narrating produces a repeated narrative; naming produces names; crafting produces craft. Folk describes certain types of customary behavior triggered by intentions and ideas – the patterns and codes – influenced by the particular settings and actors present. Although the identities and networks expressed in those settings are important, the vague notion of group becomes less important since we are often looking at the regularities in living and in expressing ourselves.

Folklorists using the behavioral concept therefore often analyze underlying structures and processes based on examining common human reactions and responses to certain problems and settings. A person is not folk, but some of his or her actions may be. Nonetheless, folk patterns are not necessarily exclusive of manifestations of formal learning. This is why it is often fallacious to talk of a "folk object"; the making of it may involve folk processes, and one can talk of materializing a folk idea or pattern, but the object itself cannot properly have a life above the maker, viewer, or user.

Ultimately, the behavioral perspective addresses at least four major relations: (1) identity and expression, (2) conduct and communication, (3) shape, *symbol*, and idea, (4) thought, feeling, and action. The first relation asks what influence a person's self-perception or others' perception of his identity has on the public and private use of folklore. Rather than merely assigning him and his expression of some categorical group, a deeper evaluation of the diversity and emergence of identity and expression commands attention as a complex sociopsychological (and often historical and physiological) phenomenon. Folklore, many have claimed, is a form of communication, and the second relation refers to how people act differently when they communicate through folklore in various situations with certain strategies in mind. The third relation accepts that unconsciously enacted patterns and projections exist, and therefore we need to know how people's experiences react to the environment and conversely how the environment reacts to experience. Out of this system, symbols and codes arise and the character of these need fuller description. Finally, if folklore is based on certain feelings, ideas, desires and physiological (including cognitive) processes, then the emergence of folklore can be studied fundamentally as the relation of thought – indeed, of imagination – and action. In doing so, behavioral folklorists typically concentrate on the individual, usually living and practicing his or her craft, in the context of the social and physical surroundings to draw general inferences and generate hypotheses on the nature of human activity. Let me add, though, that this approach does not preclude historical examples since documents can be used that display people interacting with one another and reacting to common problems and settings (Jones 1982, Bronner 1982b).

In addressing these relations the behavioral perspective implies certain systematic methods, scientific if you will. Yet it is false to assume that such a move lacks a humanistic base, for as scholars who collect impressions and explanations from informants, folklorists of course maintain the human element in their studies. Many folklorists, though, may be nervous about developing a branch of study that talks about correlating, testing, and applying. Yet both folklore and behavioral sciences rely on techniques of observation and interview. Folklorists add, however, the "humanizing" effect that many behavioral scientists have sought (Hufford 1974). Folklorists also add the dimension of studying products as measures of abstractions like cohesiveness, security, and aesthetic. Building on the knowledge of cultural products gained from folkloristic history and building up the investigation of behavior, individuals, and processes that together generate those products compose the unique promise of a behavioral science concept of folkloristics.

Richard Bauman spoke to this promise more than a decade ago, yet the "scientific study of folklore behavior" he advocated made only scant headway toward a full exposition. Many mistook performance-centered folkloristics for such a study, but its restriction to the aesthetics of mostly festive or narrative genres meant that it stopped at being anything more than one type of descriptive criteria. The dramaturgical metaphor, as Abrahams (1981) recently admitted, while appealing, did not apply to most forms of traditional behavior, and as a result could not *explain* the emergence and

² This observation was made by Alan Jabbour at the conference on Aesthetic Expression in the City: "Art, Folk Art, and Popular Culture," University of California, Los Angeles, February 1982.