

social consciousness (Gisbert 1959: 361). Because of the principle of actuality Durkheim could incorporate the individual consciousness or representations into the higher synthesis of society and leave the self out of account (Gisbert 1959: 365). But the principle of actuality was never meant to deny the reality of individual existence. Rather it served to mark the special character of psychology as different from the natural sciences. According to Wundt the objects of the natural sciences exist as if there were no subject. The subject postulates through a process of abstraction a physical substratum, which is the underlying principle of all natural phenomena. But psychology has no need for such an abstraction as it deals directly with its objects which are given in the consciousness of the subject itself. To postulate a soul substance is to draw a false analogy between the psychical and physical world (Haeberlin 1916). Gisbert sees Wundt as a representative of the British psychological tradition of J. S. Mill and his predecessors (Gisbert 1959: 363). They based their associationism on the coalescence of separate elementary reactions to external influence. Wundt, on the other hand, was indebted to the views of Herbart, who regarded the elements of the mind as expressions of its underlying unity and saw association as based on the self-activity of an apperceiving whole (Danziger 1980a: 78-79).

The second principle derived from Wundt which Gisbert sees as having had a decisive influence on Durkheim is the principle of creative synthesis. Following Boring, Gisbert mistakenly identifies it as "mental chemistry." But for Wundt the chemical analogy could only illustrate one aspect of certain psychic processes, because in general mental causality is quite different from physical causality. Mental causality is "creative," which makes it impossible in principle to predict from the nature of the parts the properties of the whole, as one can do in the case of compounds in the physical world (Danziger 1980a: 80-81).

Gisbert sees in a combination of the principle of actuality with the principle of creative synthesis a convincing explanation of what Durkheim means by social facts, collective representations, and the like. "As individual men-

tal acts duly combined into a process constitute the individual consciousness without the need of any substantial entity, so the synthesis formed by, or derived from, individual minds constitutes the collective consciousness as a synthesis of syntheses without any need of a substantive group-mind, group-soul, or hypostasis, though the resulting synthesis is superior in nature to its component elements" (Gisbert 1959: 361). As Gisbert himself recognizes, the problem with this interpretation is that although Durkheim did quite often write as if society was characterized by a kind of group-mind, this view was explicitly rejected by Wundt himself (Gisbert 1959: 362). However, collective mental phenomena such as language, myths, and traditional customs were very important for Wundt as the only source of data on the functioning and development of those aspects of the human mind which could not be investigated by experimental laboratory methods (cf. Danziger 1979: 207). Wundt recognized that interaction among individuals gives rise to collective values and norms which constitute at least part of their consciousness. Therefore it is perfectly legitimate to study collective cultural products such as myths in order to gain an insight into the functioning of the human mind. Whether it is profitable to do so without analyzing the social processes which create and maintain such products is rather a matter of perspective than of truth or falsehood. Durkheim, on the other hand, claimed that social facts constitute a separate realm. He need only to have claimed that "social" facts cannot be wholly explained in term of "individual" facts; instead he claimed that they can only be explained in terms of other social facts (Lukes 1973: 20).

In the third place Gisbert mentions the principle of relating analysis which means that "if we resolve a psychic act into its component parts, these will still keep their relations to the whole, showing thereby certain properties which they would not have shown had they always remained isolated." According to Gisbert this principle has been generally accepted by practically all modern psychologists and sociologists, and does not call for any special comments on his part (Gisbert 1959: 362).