

polemical reply to a paper by Dilthey, who had adopted Wundt's position on the status of psychology as belonging to the *Geisteswissenschaften*. Titchener propagated these new ideas in the USA, where they became very influential, if not dominant, and determined the further development of psychology decisively (Danziger 1979: 209–210, 214–215). The new psychology was inspired by the positivist philosophy of Mach and Avenarius. They rejected the metaphysical dualism of the mental and the physical. Although our experiences are admitted as valid data, scientific psychology should abjure all mentalistic explanatory concepts, precisely because they are not part of our basic experience (Danziger 1979: 210). Thus when dealing with the experiencing individual Külpe rejects the "psychical individual," a creature of subjective processes and capacities, in favour of the "corporal individual," the seat of physiological processes (Danziger 1979: 209). Ebbinghaus substituted the more elegant term "organism," an organized individual, conceived exclusively as a biological phenomenon, and not, as Wundt would have it, as an agent of cultural values (Danziger 1979: 215).

When Durkheim wrote his article in 1898 he had lost faith in the automatically ensuing beneficial consequences of the increased division of labour for the social solidarity of modern society. He had come to the conclusion that collective sentiments and ideas had to be used consciously to create such social solidarity (Lukes 1973: 166–167). Correspondingly he claimed that collective representations were partially autonomous realities which live their own life, although initially they were dependent on their social substratum: the number of social elements, the way in which they are grouped and distributed, etc. They had the power to attract and repel each other and to form amongst themselves various syntheses, which are determined by their natural affinities and not by the state of the environment in the midst of which they evolve (Durkheim 1898 in: 1924/1963: 42–43; cf. Lukes 1973: 233).

It stands to reason that Durkheim who sought to prove through analogy that collective representations were connected with the social substratum in the same way as individual rep-

resentations were linked to their physiological base, had no use for the criticisms raised by Külpe and Ebbinghaus, but adhered closely to the original insights of Wundt (Durkheim 1898, in: 1924/1963: 1–2). Moreover Wundt himself stressed the fundamental importance of the study of collective ideas. For him psychology had two aspects: individual and social (Danziger 1979: 207). The simpler psychological processes which are important for individual psychology can be investigated through experimentation. But the complex products of these processes have a socio-historical character and must be studied by what Wundt called *Völkerpsychologie*, which has as its subject matter collective ideas, especially language, myth, and customary behaviour (morals and manners).

The content of collective ideas transcends individual consciousness and their development is determined by general laws which cannot for that reason be derived from individual psychology. Nor should the enquiry be subsumed under history which is concerned with the unique character of past events. Although Wundt's conception of *Völkerpsychologie* is much more restricted than that of Lazarus and Steinthal, who coined the term, he wants to retain the term because the *Volksgemeinschaft* is by far the most important setting within which communal mental life can develop. Language is the form in which communal ideas and their mutual relations appear. Myth shows the original content of these ideas as determined by feelings and motives. Customary behaviour expresses the general direction of the communal will which arises from these ideas and motives. Language, myth, and custom form an indissoluble whole and apart from the separate analysis of these aspects of communal life we must also trace their interrelationships. Other products of communal life can be disregarded because only language, myth, and custom have developed in a way which makes individual contributions relatively unimportant. If we want to know what is essential in our study of the communal mind, in the same way in which individual psychology concentrates on single consciousness, we must restrict ourselves to these privileged fields (Wundt 1886b).

Already in his opening lecture at Bordeaux,